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by the Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920 (P.L. 66-215) and FERS was established by the Federal 
Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-335). Under both CSRS and FERS, employees and 
their employing agencies make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF), 
from which pension benefits are paid to retirees and their surviving dependents. Retirement and disability 
benefits under FERS are fully funded by employee and employer contributions and interest earned by the 
bonds in which the contributions are invested. The cost of the retirement and disability benefits earned by 
employees covered by CSRS, on the other hand, are not fully funded by agency and employee 
contributions and interest income. The federal government therefore makes supplemental payments each 
year into the civil service trust fund on behalf of employees covered by CSRS. Even with these additional 
payments into the trust fund, however, CSRS pensions are not fully pre-funded. 
Prior to 1984, federal employees did not pay Social Security payroll taxes and did not earn Social Security 
benefits. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) mandated Social Security coverage for 
civilian federal employees hired on or after January 1, 1984. This change was made in part because the 
Social Security system needed additional cash contributions to remain solvent. Enrolling federal workers 
in both CSRS and Social Security, however, would have resulted in duplication of some benefits and would 
have required employee contributions equal to more than 13% of workers’ salaries. Consequently, 
Congress directed the development of the FERS, with Social Security as the cornerstone. The FERS is 
composed of three elements: (1) Social Security, (2) the FERS basic retirement annuity and the FERS 
supplement, and (3) the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Most permanent federal employees initially hired on or 
after January 1, 1984, are enrolled in the FERS, as are employees who voluntarily switched from CSRS to 
FERS during “open seasons” held in 1987 and 1998. 
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Summary 
Most of the civilian federal workforce is covered by one of two retirement systems: (1) the Civil 
Service Retirement System (CSRS) for individuals hired before 1984 or (2) the Federal 
Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) for individuals hired in 1984 or later. FERS annuities are 
fully funded by the sum of employee and employer contributions and interest earned by the 
Treasury bonds held by the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). The federal 
government makes supplemental payments into the CSRDF on behalf of employees covered by 
the CSRS because employee and agency contributions and interest earnings do not meet the full 
cost of the benefits earned by employees covered by that system. 
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) estimated that in FY2014, obligations from the 
CSRDF would total $80.0 billion, of which $79.4 billion will represent annuity payments to 
retirees and survivors. Other outlays consist of refunds, payments to estates, and administrative 
expenses. Obligations from the fund are projected to increase by 3.4% to $82.7 billion in 
FY2015, of which $82.1 billion will represent annuity payments. OPM estimated that receipts to 
the CSRDF from all sources would be $95.3 billion in FY2014 and $98.5 billion in FY2015. The 
year-end balance of the CSRDF was projected to increase from $848.5 billion at the end of 
FY2014 to $861.8 billion at the end of FY2015. 
The total annual income of the CSRDF will increase from $94.8 billion in FY2012 to an 
estimated $158.8 billion in FY2025 and to $1.1 trillion in FY2090. The total expenses of the fund 
are projected to rise more slowly, increasing from $73.9 billion in FY2012 to an estimated $115.0 
billion in FY2025 and to $715.8 billion in FY2090. Consequently, the assets held by the CSRDF 
also are projected to increase steadily, rising from $829.1 billion in FY2012 to an estimated $1.3 
trillion in FY2025 and $13.7 trillion in FY2090. Expenditures from the CSRDF currently are 
about 38% as large as federal expenditures for the salaries and wages paid to federal employees. 
Pension expenditures are projected to decline relative to the government’s wage and salary 
expenses, beginning around FY2020. By FY2090, the expenditures of the CSRDF are estimated 
to be only about 30% as large as the government’s expenditures for wage and salary payments to 
employees. 
Because CSRS retirement benefits have never been fully funded by employer and employee 
contributions, the CSRDF has an unfunded liability. The unfunded liability was $789.9 billion in 
FY2012. According to actuarial estimates, the unfunded liability of the CSRDF will continue to 
rise until about FY2025, when it will peak at $855.9 billion. From that point onward, the 
unfunded liability will steadily decline and is projected to turn into a surplus of $29.5 billion by 
FY2090. Actuarial estimates indicate that the unfunded liability of the CSRS does not pose a 
threat to the solvency of the trust fund. Unlike the Social Security trust fund, there is no point 
over the next 80 years at which the assets of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund are 
projected to run out.  
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Introduction 
Pensions for civilian federal employees are provided through two programs, the Civil Service 
Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). CSRS was 
authorized by the Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920 (P.L. 66-215) and FERS was established 
by the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-335). Under both CSRS and 
FERS, employees and their employing agencies make contributions to the Civil Service 
Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF), from which pension benefits are paid to retirees and 
their surviving dependents. Retirement and disability benefits under FERS are fully funded by 
employee and employer contributions and interest earned by the bonds in which the contributions 
are invested. The cost of the retirement and disability benefits earned by employees covered by 
CSRS, on the other hand, are not fully funded by agency and employee contributions and interest 
income. The federal government therefore makes supplemental payments each year into the civil 
service trust fund on behalf of employees covered by CSRS. Even with these additional payments 
into the trust fund, however, CSRS pensions are not fully pre-funded. 
Prior to 1984, federal employees did not pay Social Security payroll taxes and did not earn Social 
Security benefits. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) mandated Social 
Security coverage for civilian federal employees hired on or after January 1, 1984. This change 
was made in part because the Social Security system needed additional cash contributions to 
remain solvent. Enrolling federal workers in both CSRS and Social Security, however, would 
have resulted in duplication of some benefits and would have required employee contributions 
equal to more than 13% of workers’ salaries. Consequently, Congress directed the development of 
the FERS, with Social Security as the cornerstone. The FERS is composed of three elements: (1) 
Social Security, (2) the FERS basic retirement annuity and the FERS supplement, and (3) the 
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).1 Most permanent federal employees initially hired on or after January 
1, 1984, are enrolled in the FERS, as are employees who voluntarily switched from CSRS to 
FERS during “open seasons” held in 1987 and 1998. 
Fundamentals of Pension Plan Financing 
Retirement plans are classified as either defined benefit (DB) plans or defined contribution (DC) 
plans. In a DB plan, the retirement benefit typically is based on an employee’s salary and years of 
service. Under federal law, a DB plan must offer participants the option to take their benefit as a 
life annuity. A DC plan—for example, a 401(k)—is much like a savings account maintained by 
the employer on behalf of each participating employee. The employer or the employee or both 
contribute to an account, which is invested in assets such as stocks and bonds. In some DC plans, 
the amount of the employer contribution depends on how much the employee contributes from 
his or her pay. When the worker retires, he or she receives the balance in the account, which is the 
sum of all the contributions that have been made plus interest, dividends, and capital gains (or 
losses). This is usually paid as a lump-sum, but the employee sometimes has the option to receive 
benefits as a series of fixed payments over a period of years or as an annuity. 
                                                 
1 This report describes the financing of CSRS and the FERS basic annuity. The Thrift Savings Plan is described in CRS 
Report RL30387, Federal Employees’ Retirement System: The Role of the Thrift Savings Plan, by Katelin P. Isaacs. 
Federal Employees’ Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 2 
An important difference between DB plans and DC plans is that the employer bears the financial 
risk in a DB plan, whereas the employee bears the financial risk in a DC plan. In a DB plan, the 
employer promises to provide retirement benefits equal to a certain dollar amount or a specific 
percentage of the employee’s pay. Under federal law, employers in the private sector are required 
to pre-fund these benefits by setting aside money in a trust fund, which is typically invested in 
stocks, bonds, and other assets. The employer is at risk for the full amount of retirement benefits 
its employees have earned. If the assets held in the pension fund are worth less than the present 
value of the benefits that have been accrued under the plan, the employer is required by law to 
make up this deficit—called an unfunded liability—through additional contributions over a 
period of years. 
In a DC plan, it is the employee who bears the risk that markets will decline (“market risk”) or 
that the specific investments he or she chooses will fall in value (“investment risk”). If the 
contributions to the account are inadequate, or if the securities in which the account is invested 
lose value or increase in value too slowly, the employee risks having an income in retirement that 
is too small to maintain his or her desired standard of living. If this situation occurs, the worker 
might find it necessary to delay retirement. 
Pre-funding of Pension Benefits in the Private Sector 
Private-sector employers are not required to provide retirement plans for their employees, but 
those that do must comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; 
P.L. 93-406).2 ERISA sets standards that plans must meet with respect to reporting and 
disclosure, employee participation and vesting, plan funding, and fiduciary standards. 
Because employers cannot be certain that their revenues in future years will be sufficient to pay 
the pension benefits they owe to retired workers, ERISA requires companies to pre-fund DB 
pension obligations. Pre-funding of DB pensions protects employees who have earned the right to 
receive a pension, even if the firm goes out of business. Employers in the private sector pre-fund 
their DB pension liabilities by establishing pension trusts, which are invested in assets such as 
stocks and bonds. ERISA also established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 
which pays pension benefits (up to limits set in law) in the event that a company goes out of 
business with an underfunded pension plan. The PBGC is funded by premiums paid by employers 
that sponsor defined benefit pensions. It does not insure defined contribution plans.3 
Pre-funding DB pension benefits is consistent with the principles of accrual accounting, in which 
a firm’s assets and liabilities are recognized in its financial records as they accrue, as opposed to 
waiting until cash is received or paid out. By providing for future pension liabilities as they are 
incurred, the firm is recognizing that the pension benefits that it must pay in the future are part of 
the cost of doing business today. When an employer fails to set aside enough money each year to 
pay the retirement benefits accrued by its workers that year, it accumulates an “unfunded 
liability.” ERISA requires any employer that develops an unfunded liability in its defined benefit 
pension plan to make additional contributions over a period of years until the plan’s assets equal 
the present value of its liabilities. 
                                                 
2 Neither federal nor state and local employee pension plans are subject to ERISA. Federal employee pension plans are 
governed by Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Pensions for state and local government employees are governed by state laws. 
3 For additional information on the PBGC, see CRS Report 95-118, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
and Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding Issues, by John J. Topoleski. 
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Pre-funding of Federal Employee Pension Benefits 
When CSRS was established in 1920, it was not pre-funded. Benefits paid to federal retirees were 
paid from current contributions to the plan. Because the federal government is not likely to go out 
of business, it could have continued to pay the pensions earned by federal employees on a pay-as-
you-go basis. Nevertheless, when Congress established FERS in 1986, it required all pension 
benefits earned under FERS to be fully pre-funded by the sum of employer and employee 
contributions and the interest earned by the U.S. Treasury bonds held by the Civil Service 
Retirement and Disability Fund. Congress required pre-funding of FERS retirement benefits so 
that federal agencies would have to recognize these costs in their budgets. Pre-funding promotes 
more efficient allocation of resources between personnel costs and other expenses because it 
forces federal agencies to recognize the full cost of employee compensation when they prepare 
their annual budget requests. 
Investment of Trust Fund Assets 
The assets in private-sector pension funds represent a “store of wealth” that firms can use to meet 
pension obligations as they come due. The CSRDF, however, is not a store of wealth for the 
federal government. The fund is required by law to invest exclusively in U.S. Treasury bonds. 
These bonds represent budget authority, which is the legal basis for the Treasury to disburse 
funds. When the CSRDF redeems the Treasury bonds that it holds, the Treasury must raise an 
equivalent amount of cash by collecting taxes or borrowing from the public. 
If the CSRDF held assets that earned a higher average rate of return than U.S. Treasury bonds, 
some of the future cost of civil service retirement annuities could be paid from these higher 
investment returns. However, in the short run, allowing the CSRDF to invest in private-sector 
securities such as corporate stocks and bonds would result in higher federal expenditures, which 
would be required to purchase such private-sector securities. The trust fund’s two main sources of 
income are employee contributions and contributions from federal agencies on behalf of their 
employees. Employee contributions are income both to the federal government and to the trust 
fund. Agency contributions, however, are income to the trust fund, but they are not income to the 
federal government. Agency contributions to the CSRDF are intragovernmental transfers that 
have no effect on the government’s annual budget deficit or surplus. 
Currently, most outlays from the trust fund are benefit payments to annuitants. If the CSRDF 
were to purchase private-sector assets rather than U.S. Treasury bonds, an outlay from the trust 
fund would be required to purchase these assets. If employee contributions were used to purchase 
private-sector assets, they would no longer be income to the Treasury, and they would increase 
the federal budget deficit by the amount diverted to purchase private-sector assets. Agency 
contributions—currently an intragovernmental transfer—would instead be used to purchase 
private-sector assets and would be a new outlay of funds from the Treasury. 
Over the long run, however, purchasing private-sector assets would not increase the budget 
deficit, and could reduce it. Outlays would be moved from the future—where they would have 
occurred as benefit payments—to the present, where they would occur to purchase assets. If the 
net rate of return on private-sector securities exceeded the rate of return on Treasury bonds, the 
extra investment income earned by the trust fund would reduce the amount of tax revenue that 
would have to be raised from the public in the future to pay pension benefits under CSRS and 
FERS. Such a change in policy, however, would raise important questions about the federal 
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government owning private-sector assets, and also could result in greater volatility in the value of 
the assets held by the trust funds. 
Financing Retirement Annuities for 
Federal Employees 
Under both CSRS and FERS, retirement annuities are based on (1) the employee’s years of 
service, (2) the average of the employee’s highest three consecutive years of salary, and (3) the 
benefit accrual rate. Workers covered by CSRS accrue benefits equal to 1.5% of pay for their first 
five years of service, 1.75% for the next five years, and 2.0% of pay for each year of service 
beyond the 10th year. Under CSRS, an employee with 30 years of service will have earned an 
annuity equal to 56.25% of the average of his or her highest three consecutive years of pay. 
Employees enrolled in FERS accrue benefits equal to 1.0% of pay for each year of service. If they 
have worked for the federal government for 20 or more years and retire at age 62 or older, the 
accrual rate under FERS is 1.1% for each year of service. With 30 years of service, an employee 
enrolled in FERS will have earned a pension equal to 30% of the average of his or her highest 
three consecutive years of pay, or 33% if the individual is 62 or older at retirement.4 
Federal agencies pre-fund employee pensions by deferring some of their budget authority until it 
is needed to pay pensions to retired workers. Federal agencies defer this budget authority by 
transferring it to the CSRDF. The Treasury credits the fund with the appropriate amount of budget 
authority in the form of special-issue bonds that earn interest equal to the average rate on the 
Treasury’s outstanding long-term debt. The CSRDF can redeem these bonds to pay pensions to 
retirees and survivors. 
Employee Contributions 
Federal employees have mandatory contributions to the CSRDF deducted from their paychecks. 
Employees who are under the CSRS contribute 7.0% of basic pay to the CSRDF. Employees 
under FERS first hired before 2013 contribute 0.8% of pay to the CSRDF and 6.2% of wages to 
the Social Security trust fund for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) up to the 
Social Security taxable wage base. In 2014, wages up to $117,000 are subject to the OASDI tax.5 
Employees under FERS first hired (or rehired with less than five years of FERS service) in 
calendar year 2013 contribute 3.1% of pay to the CSRDF and 6.2% of taxable wages to the Social 
Security trust fund.6 FERS employees first hired (or rehired with less than five years of FERS 
                                                 
4 Under FERS, an employee who retires at the minimum retirement age (age 55 for workers born before 1948; 
increasing for workers born after 1947; age 57 for workers born in 1970 or later) with 30 or more years of service or at 
age 60 with 20 years of service also receives the “FERS supplement.” The supplement is equal to the Social Security 
benefit that the individual earned while a federal employee. The FERS supplement terminates at the age of 62, 
regardless of whether the person applies for Social Security. 
5 Retired federal employees are eligible for Medicare at the age of 65, regardless of whether they were covered by 
CSRS or FERS. Employees in both programs pay the Hospital Insurance (HI) payroll tax of 1.45% on all salary and 
wages. 
6 These higher FERS employee contributions for individuals first hired (or rehired with less than five years of service) 
in calendar year 2013 were enacted under the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96). 
Certain categories of CSRS and FERS employees—including Members of Congress and congressional employees first 
covered before 2013 as well as law enforcement personnel—make employee contributions to the CSRDF at different 
(continued...) 
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service) after December 31, 2013, contribute 4.4% of pay to the CSRDF and 6.2% of taxable 
wages to the Social Security trust fund.7 
Employer Contributions 
Whether a federal employee is enrolled in CSRS or FERS, his or her employing agency 
contributes money to the CSRDF. Agency contributions differ between CSRS and FERS. The 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) estimates the cost of CSRS annuities to be equal to 
26.0% of employee pay. This is the amount that would have to be contributed to the CSRDF each 
year to fully fund the benefits that employees earn under the CSRS. Under CSRS, employees and 
their employing agencies each contribute an amount equal to 7.0% of pay the CSRDF. Agency 
and employee contributions total 14.0% of pay. The Treasury makes an annual contribution to the 
CSRDF that covers most of the costs of the CSRS that are not covered by employee and agency 
contributions. In FY2014, the Treasury will pay an estimated $35.5 billion to the CSRDF. 
However, the CSRS continues to have an unfunded liability, which was $750.9 billion in 
FY2012.8 
OPM estimates the cost of the FERS basic annuity and the FERS supplement to be equal to 
12.7% of employee pay. The employee contribution of 0.8% of pay under FERS for employees 
first hired before 2013 is equal to the difference between the CSRS contribution rate (7.0%) and 
the Social Security payroll tax rate (6.2%). Federal agencies are required to contribute to the 
CSRDF the full cost of the FERS benefits that employees earn each year, minus the employee 
contribution. Thus, federal agencies contribute an amount equal to 11.9% of payroll to the 
CSRDF for FERS employees hired before 2013. 
Because of the increased employee contributions enacted under P.L. 112-96, federal agencies 
contribute 9.6% of payroll to the CSRDF for FERS employees hired (or rehired with less than 
five years of FERS service) in calendar year 2013.9 The increased FERS employee contributions 
under P.L. 113-67, however, did not proportionately reduce agency contributions to FERS. 
Instead, employer contributions for employees first hired (or rehired with less than five years of 
FERS service) after December 31, 2013, remain unchanged; additional funds will be used to pay 
down the current unfunded liability of CSRS. When the CSRS unfunded liability has eliminated, 
FERS employer contributions for new employees first hired in 2014 will be recalculated and 
adjusted to be based on the dynamic normal cost of FERS.  
                                                                 
(...continued) 
rates of pay than regular FERS employees. For details on employee contributions for Members of Congress, see CRS 
Report RL30631, Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress, by Katelin P. Isaacs. For details on employee 
contributions for law enforcement personnel, see CRS Report R42631, Retirement Benefits for Federal Law 
Enforcement Personnel, by Katelin P. Isaacs. 
7 These additional FERS employee contributions for individuals first hired (or rehired with less than five years of 
service) after December 31, 2013, were enacted under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67). 
8 Data for FY2012 are the most recent actual CSRDF program data available. The cost of future cost-of-living 
adjustments (COLAs) paid to retirees is not covered by contributions from employees, their employing agencies, or the 
Treasury. As a result, the CSRS continues to accrue an unfunded liability. 
9 For additional details on changes to FERS employee and agency contributions under P.L. 112-96, see U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, Benefits Administration Letter, 12-104, “Federal Employees Retirement System-Revised 
Annuity Employees (RAE),” October 3, 2012, available online at http://www.opm.gov/retire/pubs/bals/2012/12-
104.pdf. 
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Therefore, FERS benefits are fully funded by employer and employee contributions and interest 
earnings with the exception of FERS benefits for employees first hired (or rehired with less than 
five years of FERS service) after December 31, 2013. For this latter category of FERS employee, 
the employee and agency contributions amount to more than the full cost of the FERS benefit 
until the point at which OPM determines that there is no longer a CSRS unfunded liability. 
Operation of the Civil Service Retirement and 
Disability Fund 
The CSRDF is a record of the budget authority available to pay retirement and disability benefits 
to federal employees. Each year, the trust fund is credited by the Treasury with contributions from 
current employees and their employing agencies, interest on the securities held by the fund, 
interest on previous service for which benefits have been accrued but for which budget authority 
has not yet been provided, and a transfer from the general revenues of the Treasury. Only a small 
part of the income to the fund—mainly contributions from employees—is income to both the 
trust fund and to the government. The remainder of these transactions are intragovernmental 
transfers in which budget authority is transferred from federal agencies to the trust fund. 
Intragovernmental transfers have no effect on the size of the government’s annual budget deficit 
or surplus.10 
The CSRDF is similar to the Social Security trust fund in that, by law, 100% of its assets are 
invested in special-issue U.S. Treasury bonds or other bonds backed by the full faith and credit of 
the United States government. When the trust fund needs cash to pay retirement benefits, it 
redeems the bonds and the Treasury disburses an equivalent dollar value of payments to civil 
service annuitants. Because the bonds held by the trust fund are a claim on the U.S. Treasury, they 
ultimately are paid for by the taxpayers. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), balances in the trust fund are 
available for future benefit payments and other trust fund expenditures, but only in a 
bookkeeping sense. The holdings of the trust funds are not assets of the Government as a 
whole that can be drawn down in the future to fund benefits. Instead, they are claims on the 
Treasury. From a cash perspective, when trust fund holdings are redeemed to authorize the 
payment of benefits, the Department of the Treasury finances the expenditure in the same 
way as any other Federal expenditure—by using current receipts or by borrowing from the 
public. The existence of large trust fund balances, therefore, does not, by itself, increase the 
Government’s ability to pay benefits. Put differently, these trust fund balances are assets of 
the program agencies and corresponding liabilities of the Treasury, netting to zero for the 
Government as a whole.11 
                                                 
10 Only revenues collected from the public and outlays to the public affect the budget deficit. 
11 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010: Analytical 
Perspectives (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 345. 
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Financial Status of the Civil Service 
Retirement Fund 
The Short-Term Picture 
The CSRDF held a balance of $835.7 billion at the end of FY2013. (See Table 1.)12 Obligations 
from the fund totaled $77.5 billion in FY2013, consisting mostly of annuity payments. Annuity 
payments totaled $76.9 billion in FY2013. Payments to the estates of decedents and refunds to 
separating employees accounted for another $445 million. The administrative expenses of the 
fund were $128 million, or about 0.17% of total obligations. In FY2013, an additional $2 million 
was transferred from the CSRDF to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which hears federal 
employee appeals (including federal retirement decisions). 
Each year, the CSRDF receives cash contributions and intragovernmental transfers. Cash 
contributions from required employee contributions, other employee deposits, and the District of 
Columbia amounted to $3.5 billion in FY2013. The largest payments into the CSRDF were 
contributions from federal agencies ($21.9 billion in FY2013) and the Postal Service ($2.9 billion 
in FY2013) on behalf of their employees, interest payments ($32.1 billion), and a payment from 
the general fund of the Treasury to make up for the insufficient funding of benefits accrued under 
CSRS ($33.0 billion in FY2013). In FY2013, there was also a $50 million payment into the 
CSRDF due to offsets from the re-employment of annuitants. These payments are 
intragovernmental transfers. The CSRDF receives Treasury bonds as a record of available budget 
authority. It redeems bonds periodically as annuity payments come due. 
Finally, the short-term term picture of the CSRDF, as estimated in the FY2015 President’s 
Budget, includes a proposal to refund overpayments made by the U.S. Postal Service on behalf of 
its FERS employees. This proposal would involve additional obligations from the CSRDF 
estimated to be $2.5 billion in FY2014 and $2.5 billion in FY2015.13 
                                                 
12 All amounts in Table 1 and Table 2 are expressed in nominal dollars. 
13 For more details on this proposal, see page 1232 of the “Budget Appendix” of the FY2015 President’s Budget, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/opm.pdf. 
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Table 1. Receipts and Obligations of the Civil Service Retirement Fund, FY2013-2015 
(amounts in millions) 
 FY2013 FY2014 (est.) FY2015 (est.) 
Beginning balance $819,753 $835,685 $848,480
Receipts to the fund  
Cash receipts:  
Employee contributions $2,817 $2,991 $3,054
District of Columbia $26 $25 $23
Other employee deposits $677 $706 $739
Intragovernmental transfers:  
Agency contributions $21,919 $21,860 $25,647
Postal Service contributions $2,882 $3,047 $3,282
Interest on securities $32,083 $31,136 $29,470
General fund receipts $32,995 $35,470 $36,264
Re-employment offset $50 $49 $48
Total receipts to the fund $93,449 $95,284 $98,527
Obligations from the fund  
Employee and survivor annuities -$76,938 -$79,433 -$82,123
Refunds and payments to estates -$445 -$458 -$484
Administration -$128 -$96 -$95
Transfer to Merit Systems Protection Board $2 $2 $2
Total obligations from the fund -$77,513 -$79,989 -$82,704
Proposal: Refund USPS FERS overpayment -$0 -$2,500 -$2,500
Ending balance $835,685a $848,480 $861,803
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, FY2015. 
a. Includes rounding adjustment of -$4 million.  
The Long-Term Picture 
Table 2 presents the annual income and expenditures of the CSRDF through FY2090, as 
estimated by OPM. Table 2 also shows the year-end balance of the trust fund and its estimated 
unfunded actuarial liability at the end of the year. The unfunded actuarial liability represents the 
difference between the present value of the fund’s future benefit obligations and the present value 
of future credits to the fund plus the value of the securities it holds. The final two columns of the 
table show, respectively, the expenditures of the CSRDF relative to the government’s total payroll 
expense for employee wages and salaries and CSRDF expenditures relative to the nation’s annual 
gross domestic product (GDP). 
The estimates presented in Table 2 show the income to the CSRDF rising over the projection 
period from $94.8 billion in FY2012 to $158.8 billion in FY2025 and to about $1.1 trillion in 
FY2090.14 The total expenses of the fund are projected to rise more slowly, increasing from $73.9 
billion in FY2012 to $115.0 billion in FY2025 and to $715.8 billion in FY2090. Consequently, 
the assets held by the CSRDF also are projected to increase steadily from $829.1 billion in 
FY2012 to about $1.3 trillion in FY2025 and to $13.7 trillion in FY2090. According to actuarial 
                                                 
14 All amounts in Table 1 and Table 2 are expressed in nominal dollars. 
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projections, the unfunded liability of the CSRDF will continue to rise until about FY2025, when 
it will peak at $855.9 billion. From that point onward, the unfunded liability will steadily decline 
and is projected to turn into a surplus of $46.1 billion by FY2090. The CSRDF is currently 
estimated to have a surplus beginning around FY2080. 
In FY2012, expenditures from the CSRDF totaled $73.9 billion. The federal government’s payroll 
expense for employees in FY2012 was approximately $196.4 billion (not presented in Table 2). 
Therefore, expenditures from the CSRDF were equal to about 38% of the amount paid as salaries 
and wages to federal employees. CSRDF expenditures are projected to decline relative to the 
government’s wage and salary expenses, beginning around FY2025. By FY2090, the 
expenditures of the CSRDF are estimated to be equal to about 30% of the government’s wage and 
salary payments to its employees. The decline in the ratio of CSRDF outlays to salary expense 
after FY2020 will occur mainly because future retirees will receive smaller pension benefits 
under FERS than they would have received under CSRS. 
The final column of Table 2 shows federal outlays for civil service pensions as a percentage of 
GDP. Relative to the total economic resources of the economy, the expenditures of the CSRDF 
are expected to remain roughly steady for the next 10 years before declining substantially from 
FY2020 to FY2090. Federal expenditures for civil service retirement annuities were estimated to 
equal 0.48% of GDP in FY2012, down from a high of 0.55% in FY1991 (not presented in Table 
2). Between FY2012 and FY2020, the annual expenditures of the CSRDF are projected to remain 
in the range of 0.48% to 0.42% of GDP. From that point on, outlays from the CSRDF will fall 
steadily to about 0.13% of GDP by FY2090. 
CSRDF expenditures will fall relative to GDP mainly as a result of the decline in the proportion 
of civil service annuitants who are covered by CSRS and the increase in the number who are 
covered by FERS. The FERS basic annuity was designed to be smaller relative to high-three 
average pay than a CSRS annuity because FERS annuitants also receive benefits from Social 
Security and the Thrift Savings Plan. Because the transition from CSRS to FERS is mandated by 
law, the constant-dollar value of CSRDF outlays per annuitant will decline due to the different 
benefit formulas between CSRS and FERS. Consequently, outlays for civil service annuities are 
almost certain to decline relative to GDP, even if GDP grows more slowly than is assumed in the 
projections displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Projected Income and Expenses of the Civil Service Retirement Fund 
(amounts in billions) 
Fiscal  
Year 
Total  
Income 
Total  
Expenses 
Assets at 
End of  
Year 
Unfunded 
Actuarial  
Liability 
Expenses as a  
Percentage of  
Total Payroll 
Expenses as a 
Percentage of 
GDP 
Actual 
2012 94.8 -73.9 829.1 789.8 37.6 0.48 
Estimated 
2015 115.2 -82.7 923.4 820.5 39.1 0.45 
2020 137.0 -98.8 1,104.7 847.2 39.2 0.42 
2025 158.8 -115.0 1,310.0 855.9 38.5 0.39 
2030 184.7 -130.3 1,559.8 840.9 36.9 0.35 
2035 213.9 -144.8 1,873.7 801.9 34.7 0.31 
2040 249.0 -159.3 2,278.5 735.9 32.5 0.27 
2045 287.1 -174.4 2,794.6 650.1 30.3 0.24 
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Fiscal  
Year 
Total  
Income 
Total  
Expenses 
Assets at 
End of  
Year 
Unfunded 
Actuarial  
Liability 
Expenses as a  
Percentage of  
Total Payroll 
Expenses as a 
Percentage of 
GDP 
2050 337.5 -193.0 3,451.7 542.1 28.6 0.21 
2055 394.0 -219.7 4,268.4 407.2 27.7 0.19 
2060 454.9 -256.2 5,213.5 279.5 27.6 0.18 
2065 525.3 -303.1 6,277.5 170.7 27.8 0.17 
2070 607.1 -360.1 7,462.2 86.9 28.1 0.16 
2075 702.7 -427.7 8,779.6 29.0 28.5 0.15 
2080 814.6 -507.8 10,248.6 -7.5 28.8 0.15 
2085 944.8 -602.9 11,886.9 -29.9 29.1 0.14 
2090 1,094.8 -715.8 13,707.1 -46.1 29.5 0.13 
Sources: U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Annual Report of the Board of Actuaries, Civil Service Retirement and 
Disability Fund, Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2013; Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the 
President, 2014; and the 2013 Report of the Social Security Board of Trustees. 
The Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund in 
the Federal Budget 
In FY2014, the total receipts of the CSRDF are estimated to be approximately $95.3 billion, and 
obligations from the fund were about $80.0 billion. Only a small part of the revenues to the fund 
($3.7 billion) in this year were cash receipts. The remainder will consist of budget authority 
transferred from other federal agencies. The cash receipts of the fund come primarily from the 
contributions of federal employees toward their future retirement benefits. Other cash income to 
the fund comes from payments made by the District of Columbia on behalf of its employees 
covered by CSRS or FERS. Cash payments into the CSRDF are income to both the U.S. 
government and to the trust fund. These cash receipts reduce the government’s budget deficit. 
Benefit payments to retirees and survivors are cash outlays of the federal government. 
Most of the payments into the CSRDF—an estimated $91.6 billion in FY2014—are 
intragovernmental transfers. These transactions are income to the fund, but they are not income to 
the U.S. government. Intragovernmental transactions rarely involve cash. They do not affect the 
government’s budget deficit or surplus because no money is received or spent by the government. 
Cash is rarely involved in intragovernmental transfers because individual government agencies, in 
general, have no cash to spend.15 What Congress appropriates to federal agencies each year is 
budget authority. Budget authority is legal permission for an agency to spend money from the 
accounts of the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury takes in money from the public by collecting taxes 
and by borrowing, and in most cases it is only the Treasury that disburses cash to the public. 
It has been suggested from time to time that the CSRDF should be taken “off budget,” as has 
already been done with the financing of Social Security benefits (but not Social Security 
administrative costs). Taking an account off budget means that its income and expenditures are 
                                                 
15 Some federal agencies collect “user fees” or other payments from the public, but the cash receipts of federal agencies 
are trivial in comparison to the size of the federal budget. The majority of the government’s cash transactions with the 
public—collecting taxes, purchasing goods and services, paying federal employee salaries, and disbursing Social 
Security benefits, government pensions, and cash welfare—are conducted by the Treasury. 
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not included in calculations of the government’s annual budget surplus or deficit. Off-budget 
accounts are portrayed separately in the budget documents prepared by the Office of Management 
and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). However, both OMB and CBO also 
publish unified budget accounts that include Social Security and other programs that are off 
budget. This is done because taking an account off budget does not end the activity or remove its 
effects from the U.S. economy. Whether Social Security—or civil service retirement—is on-
budget or off-budget, it still collects revenues from the public, pays benefits to the public, and 
affects the nation’s financial markets by influencing the amount of private capital that is absorbed 
by government borrowing. 
Taking the CSRDF off-budget would not affect the government’s revenues or outlays in the 
unified budget accounts, but it would affect the size of the budget deficit or surplus as portrayed 
in any budget documents that excluded the CSRDF. For example, employee contributions to 
CSRS and FERS that are now counted as revenue to the Treasury would not be treated as revenue 
if they were paid to an off-budget CSRDF. The money that federal agencies now send to the trust 
fund in the form of intragovernmental transfers would instead be recorded as outlays, and would 
therefore increase the government’s reported budget deficit or reduce the budget surplus in the 
year that the transfer occurs rather than in the future when benefits are paid. The outlays made by 
the fund to pay civil service annuitants would not appear at all in the federal budget. The net 
effect of these changes if the CSRDF had been off-budget in FY2013 would have been an 
increase of about $16 billion in the government’s reported budget deficit, even though the amount 
of money collected from the public and the amount of money paid to civil service annuitants 
would have been no different than under current law.16 
One purpose of the federal budget is to show whether the government’s revenues and outlays are 
in balance or out of balance. Therefore, taking any account off-budget distorts the picture of the 
government’s fiscal condition. It is for this reason that financial analysts and economists focus 
almost exclusively on the unified budget totals when evaluating the effect of the federal budget 
on the nation’s financial markets and the economy. If “outlays” were to include amounts not 
actually paid from the Treasury in the current year (as would be the case if the CSRDF were off-
budget), then no revenue from the public would be needed in that year to pay for them. In years 
of budget deficits, some of the deficit would require borrowing from the public, and some of it 
would not. In years of modest budget surplus, there might appear to be a deficit because transfers 
to an off-budget account would be recorded as outlays, even though they do not involve payments 
from the Treasury to the public. For these reasons, taking the CSRDF off-budget might lead to 
greater confusion about the size of the real budget deficit or surplus, as has been the case with the 
off-budget status of Social Security. 
                                                 
16 Cash receipts in FY2013 ($3.5 billion) would no longer counted as revenue. Intragovernmental transfers in FY2013 
($89.9 billion) would be considered outlays. Outlays for annuities as well as refunds and payments to estates in FY2013 
($77.4 billion) would not be included in the budget. Therefore, -$3.5 billion + -$89.9 billion + $77.4 billion= -$16 
billion. 
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Civil Service Retirement: Funding and 
Accounting Issues 
Accounting for Pension Costs Under CSRS and FERS 
Actuaries use a concept called “normal cost” to estimate the amount of money that must be set 
aside each year from employer and employee contributions to pre-fund pension benefits. Normal 
cost is usually expressed as a percentage of payroll. There are two measures of normal cost: static 
and dynamic. 
• Static normal cost is the amount, expressed as a percentage of payroll, that must 
be set aside each year to fund pension benefits based on current employee pay 
with no future pay raises, no future COLAs for retirees, and a fixed rate of 
interest. 
• Dynamic normal cost is the amount, expressed as a percentage of payroll, that 
must be set aside each year to fully fund pension benefits for workers who will 
continue to accrue new benefits, including the effects of employee pay raises, 
post-retirement COLAs, and changes in the rate of interest.17 
By law, the FERS basic retirement annuity and FERS supplement must be pre-funded according 
to its dynamic normal cost. Every year, OPM estimates the dynamic normal cost of FERS 
retirement annuities for employees entering the federal work force that year. For each group of 
new employees, OPM must estimate average job tenure, turnover, future salaries, age at 
retirement, rates of disability, death rates, the number of employees who will become annuitants, 
and how many will leave surviving dependents. OPM periodically re-estimates the dynamic 
normal cost of FERS to reflect anticipated changes in interest rates, inflation, and employee and 
retiree demographic characteristics. 
OPM has estimated the normal cost of the FERS basic retirement annuity at 12.7% of payroll. 
Employee contributions for FERS employees first hired before 2013 are set in law at 0.8% of pay, 
so the contributions of federal agencies are equal to 11.9% of basic pay for these employees. For 
employees first hired (or rehired with less than five years of FERS service) in calendar year 2013, 
employee contributions are set in law at 3.1% of pay, so the agencies’ contributions for these 
employees are equal to 9.6% of basic pay.18 If the assumptions underlying these cost estimates 
prove to be accurate, FERS will be “fully funded.”19 OPM has estimated the dynamic normal cost 
                                                 
17 Interest rates must be projected because the normal cost is computed as a present value. Expressed in absolute terms, 
rather than as a percentage of payroll, the normal cost of a pension plan is the amount of money that would have to be 
invested at a given rate of return to pay future pension obligations, including increases in pension costs that will result 
from employee pay raises and retiree cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). 
18 For employees first hired (or rehired with less than five years of FERS service) after December 31, 2013, employee 
contributions are set in law at 4.4% of pay, but the agency contributions for these employees continue to 9.6% of basic 
pay. The combination of these employee and agency contributions—4.4% + 9.6%=14.0%—is greater than the current 
normal cost of FERS. Thus, the FERS employee contribution changes enacted under P.L. 113-67 delinked agency 
contributions from the FERS dynamic normal cost until the additional funds produced from the increased employee 
contributions have eliminated the CSRS unfunded liability. 
19 If the amount set aside each year proves to be insufficient (due to inaccurate assumptions about pay raises, interest 
rates, the rate of inflation, or other variables) the shortfall would be made up from the general revenues of the U.S. 
(continued...) 
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of CSRS, using the same economic assumptions used in FERS, at 26.0% of payroll. The 
financing of CSRS has at times been a topic of controversy, however, because it is not funded 
according to its dynamic normal cost. CSRS is funded through a combination of employee and 
agency contributions that together are equal to the static normal cost of CSRS, along with 
contributions from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury that make up some of the difference 
between the static normal cost of CSRS and its dynamic normal cost. 
Why Are CSRS Revenues Less Than the Present Value of Benefits? 
At the time that Congress established the CSRS in 1920, it set up a trust fund from which benefits 
would be paid. From the beginning, however, CSRS was funded on a “pay-as-you-go” basis. The 
trust fund was used to pay benefits to already-retired workers, rather than to pre-fund the pension 
benefits of current workers. Initially, only employees made regular payroll contributions to the 
fund. Regularly scheduled agency contributions were not mandated until the 1950s. For many 
years, there were so few federal retirees that the fund was able to meet its financial obligations to 
beneficiaries from employee contributions alone. 
In 1956, Congress passed P.L. 84-854, which required federal agencies to make contributions to 
the Civil Service Retirement Trust Fund on behalf of their eligible employees. The contributions 
made by federal agencies were equal in amount to the money paid into the fund by their 
employees, and were made from appropriations that agencies received specifically for this 
purpose. Even with regular contributions from the employing agencies, however, the CSRS was 
still being funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Contributions to the fund were sufficient to meet 
current benefit obligations but not to pre-fund the future retirement benefits of federal employees. 
As the federal civil service pension system matured (that is, as the ratio of annuitants to workers 
began to rise), it became necessary to establish a formal system of accounting for the pension 
obligations that had been incurred by the federal government but for which funds had not yet 
been set aside. In response to this need, Congress enacted P.L. 91-93 in 1969. This law set the 
employee contribution to CSRS at 7.0% of pay and required an equal amount to be contributed 
from funds appropriated to federal agencies. This amount (equal to 14.0% of payroll) represented 
the total contribution required to pay the costs of pension liabilities accrued by federal employees, 
using “static” assumptions: no future pay increases, no COLAs, and a 5.0% annual rate of return 
on the securities in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund. Agency and employee 
contributions under CSRS have remained at the same percentage of payroll since 1969. 
P.L. 91-93 also requires three payments to be made annually from the general revenues of the 
U.S. Treasury into the CSRDF. These payments are 
• the amount necessary to amortize (pay off with interest) over a 30-year period 
any increase in pension liability that results from pay increases (but not retiree 
COLAs) or from bringing newly covered groups of workers into the CSRS; 
• the amount of the employer’s share of the cost of benefits attributable to military 
service; and 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Treasury. See 5 U.S.C. §8423(a)(4). 
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• interest, fixed at a rate of 5%, on the estimated amount of the previously accrued 
liabilities of the CSRS for which contributions have not yet been made to the 
fund.20 
Thus, while the static costs of the CSRS were shared equally between federal employees and their 
employing agencies, the Treasury was given responsibility for pension liabilities that are not part 
of the pension system’s static normal costs. By including the 30-year amortized cost of pay raises 
in the annual transfer from the general fund, the Treasury assumed the additional pension 
expenses that result from pay raises.21 All costs of the CSRS that are not paid by employee and 
agency contributions or through the transfers to the CSRDF mandated by P.L. 91-93 ultimately 
will be paid from the general revenues of the Treasury. The costs of retiree COLAs, which also 
are not part of the static normal cost of the CSRS, are not included in the annual transfer from the 
Treasury to the CSRDF, and ultimately will be paid from the general fund of the Treasury. 
Because the full costs of CSRS are not met by the combined total of employee contributions, 
agency contributions, interest earnings, and the supplemental payments from the Treasury, some 
future CSRS benefits will of necessity be paid from contributions that were made to the CSRDF 
on behalf of employees who are enrolled in FERS. This will create an unfunded liability for 
FERS, which will be paid off through a new series of 30-year amortization payments from the 
general fund of the Treasury to the CSRDF. As stated by OPM: 
When the non-Postal CSRS account is depleted, projected to occur in 2022, the resulting 
transfers from the FERS account to the CSRS account create supplemental liabilities for the 
non-Postal FERS account. These supplement liabilities for non-Postal FERS must then be 
amortized by means of 30-year payments made by the Treasury.22 
Current law specifies that funds that were paid into the CSRDF on behalf of employees covered 
by FERS will be used to pay the unfunded liability of CSRS. FERS will then be reimbursed by a 
series of payments with interest from the general fund of the Treasury to the CSRDF. 
Accounting Issues Raised by the Way CSRS Benefits Are Financed 
Actuarial estimates indicate that the unfunded liability of the CSRS does not pose a threat to the 
solvency of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund. In its current annual report, OPM 
has stated that “total assets of the CSRDF ... including both CSRS and FERS are expected to 
continue to grow throughout the term of the projection under the existing statutory funding 
provisions.”23 Nevertheless, the current method of funding the CSRS has in recent years been a 
source of debate for at least two reasons: 
                                                 
20 Although this law mandated interest payments on the accrued CSRS liability to be made from the Treasury to the 
CSRDF at the fixed rate of 5%, it did not provide for amortizing the accumulated liability. 
21 Pay raises affect pension costs because the CSRS annuity is based on a worker’s high-three average pay. The effect 
of pay raises on future CSRS pension costs is met by amortizing them over a 30-year period with payments from the 
U.S. Treasury. Because the cost of COLAs is not accounted for in the payments to the trust fund mandated by the 1969 
law, the CSRS continues to accumulate an unfunded liability attributable to retiree COLAs. 
22 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Annual Report of the Board of Actuaries, Civil Service Retirement and 
Disability Fund, Report for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2013, p. 18. 
23 Ibid., p. 18. 
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(1) Because employee and government contributions do not account for the full actuarial cost 
of CSRS pension obligations as they accrue each year, the CSRS continues to accumulate 
additional unfunded liabilities. Consequently, some of the pension costs that are incurred each 
year will not be reflected in the government’s budget until those benefits are paid at some 
time in the future. Some budget experts argue that these costs should be accounted for in each 
agency’s budget as they accrue, just as is done in the FERS. 
(2) The supplemental payments to the trust fund that are required by the 1969 law come from 
the general revenues of the Treasury rather from the budgets of the various federal agencies 
where these costs are incurred. As a result, the amount of employee compensation for which 
agencies must account in their budgets each year understates the full costs of employment.24 
Critics say that this contributes to an inefficient allocation of resources in the federal 
government by making labor costs appear lower than they really are. 
If agencies were required to fully fund the current and future costs of the CSRS through increased 
contributions, they could do so from their current-law appropriations or they could be granted 
additional budget authority for this purpose. The two approaches would have different effects on 
the federal budget. For agencies to be held harmless for the increased contributions, they would 
have to receive additional appropriations to their salary and expense accounts.25 Because agencies 
would transfer the appropriated funds to the CSRDF, which would in turn use them to purchase 
Treasury bonds, no additional outlays would occur as a result of these appropriations, and they 
would not affect the federal budget deficit or surplus. The outlays would occur in the future when 
retired employees collect their CSRS annuities, just as under current law. 
An alternative means of fully financing the normal cost of the CSRS would be to require agencies 
to increase their contributions to the CSRDF without receiving any additional appropriations to 
their salary and expense accounts.26 Pre-funding the full costs of the CSRS in this way would 
reduce the federal budget deficit, because the outlays of each agency would have to be cut by the 
amount of its additional transfers to the CSRDF. Outlays to CSRS annuitants would still occur in 
the future just as under current law. However, these future outlays would be offset by a reduction 
in current outlays so that the future payments to CSRS annuitants could be fully pre-funded. The 
reduction in resources available for current spending, however, would force federal agencies to 
cut spending elsewhere in their budgets. 
Paying the full normal cost of CSRS through employee and agency contributions would prevent 
the system from accruing additional unfunded liabilities, but it would not reduce the previously 
accumulated liability of the CSRS. Under current law, this liability will be paid off eventually 
through a series of 30-year amortization payments from the general fund of the Treasury to the 
CSRDF. Some observers favor starting these amortization payments sooner. They note that 
private-sector employers are required by ERISA to begin paying down accumulated liabilities 
when they occur. Others advocate paying down the liability now as a way to forestall proposals 
calling for reduced pension benefits or increased employee contributions in the future. 
                                                 
24 This transfer of funds to the CSRDF from the Treasury is included in the federal budget in the account for OPM. 
25 This was proposed in the Budget of the United States, FY1996, but was not enacted. 
26 This was proposed in the FY1997 Budget of the United States, but was not enacted by Congress. 
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Conclusion 
Proposals to pre-fund CSRS in the same manner as required under FERS have grappled with the 
question of whether additional budget authority should be granted to federal agencies, or whether 
agencies should make higher contributions from their current budget authority. Many policy 
makers believe that greater pre-funding of CSRS retirement annuities would lead to improved 
accounting of personnel costs among federal agencies. However, CSRS has been closed to new 
enrollment since 1984, and the percentage of federal employees enrolled in CSRS is declining 
rapidly as these workers retire. At the beginning of FY2013, only about 10% of federal 
employees, including Postal employees, were enrolled in CSRS. With the proportion of federal 
employees enrolled in CSRS declining each year, the budgetary treatment of government 
contributions toward their retirement annuities is becoming a less pressing issue.  
Some observers have suggested that investing the CSRDF entirely in U.S. Treasury bonds does 
not represent true “pre-funding” of CSRS and FERS annuities because these bonds are merely a 
claim held by the government against its own future revenues. They suggest that at least part of 
the trust fund’s assets should be invested in private-sector stocks and bonds where they could earn 
a higher rate of return than is available from U.S. Treasury securities (albeit at greater risk). In 
addition to issues of investment risk, however, this proposal would raise questions about how 
purchases of private-sector assets would be scored under current budget rules, and also whether it 
would be appropriate for federal trust funds to own the stocks and bonds of private-sector 
companies. 
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